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 A HUMANIST CONTRIBUTION
 ΤΟ THE INTELLECT/ WILL DEBATE
 IN THE FIFTEENTH-CENTURY FLORENCE:
 ALAMANNO DONATI'S DE INTELLECTUS
 VOLUNTATISQUE EXCELLENTIA (1482-1487)
 Amos Edelheit
 SUMMARY
 The focus of this article is Alamanno Donati's On the Excellence of Intellect and Will
 (1482-1487). This short treatise provides further evidence for the connection between
 humanist and scholastic thinkers in Renaissance Florence, and their common interest
 in philosophical and theological questions which were part of the medieval héritage.
 Because of his untimely death, Donati cannot be regarded as a figure of major impor
 tance; nonetheless, his significance lies in the fact that he was able to bridge the gap
 between a humanist-oriented philosopher such as Marsilio Ficino and contemporary
 scholastic thinkers such as Vincenzo Bandello and Giorgio Benigno Salviati. This ar
 ticle attempts to show how, according to Donati, self-reflexivity becomes both the
 condition through which man can make use of his highest powers - the intellect and
 the will - and the instrument through which he becomes closer to God; thus, it is es
 sential to both theology and ethics.
 ι. Humanists and scholastics in the light of the debate
 CONCERNING THE INTELLECT AND THE WILL
 The intellectual history of the fifteenth century has attraeteci scholarly attention, for the most part, to a new trend represented by a hetero
 geneous group of lay intellectuals who were professional men of letters:
 the humanists, who dedicated themselves to the studia humanitatis and the
 artes sermonales, developing new scholarly methods (philological and his
 torical approaches) and using them in their efforts to recover ancient Greek
 and Latin texts.1 The humanists were regarded as precursors of modernity,
 Amos.Edelheit@nuim.ie
 1 For the beginnings of the humanìst movement in Italy see R. G. Wιττ, 'In the Footsteps of
 the Ancients'. The Origins of Humanism front Lavato to Bruni, Leiden, Brill, 2000. For some detai
 led studies of humanists in many différent contexts and an appréciation of their achievements
 see the works of E. Garin, Medioevo e Rinascimento, Bari, Laterza, 1954 (repr. 1973); L'umanesimo
 italiano. Filosofia e vita civile nel Rinascimento, Bari, Laterza, 1952 (repr. 1970) ; La culturafilosofica
 del Rinascimento italiano - ricerche e documenti, Firenze, Sansoni, 1961. See also the works of P.
 «BRUNIANA ér CAMP ANELLI A Ν A», XVIII, 1, 2012
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 sharp critics of traditional viewpoints, pioneers of the scientific revolution,
 rationalism, and secularization in the West.1 Although it is easy to criticize
 these historiographical assumptions, I would like to focus in the présent
 study on another issue, stili relatively neglected by many scholars of the
 Renaissance: the humanist approach to traditional questions which were
 discussed in the scholastic schools. I shall présent a case-study concerning
 one particular question, which concerns the intellect and the will as the
 two dominant faculties in the human soul. By doing so, I hope to clarify the
 relations between humanists and scholastics and to offer a contextualized
 perspective from which to appreciate both groups.
 The question concerning the intellect and the will - one of the most
 disputed subjects by late scholastic thinkers, Thomists and Scotists alike -
 seems to have received a new impetus during the fifteenth century. It is
 enough to mention here the debate on this question between Lorenzo de'
 Medici and Marsilio Ficino, which took place in Careggi in 1474, and the
 scholastic reaction to this dispute by a leading Dominican theologian, Vin
 cenzo Bandello,2 or an important treatise by a leading Franciscan thinker,
 Ο. Kristeller, Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratu
 ra, 1969; Renaissance Thought and its Sources, ed. M. Mooney, New York, Columbia University
 Press, 1979; Idem, Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, m, Roma, Edizioni diStoria e Let
 teratura, 1993. On the différent approaches of Garin and Kristeller, see J. Hankins, Two Twen
 tieth-Century Interpreters of Renaissance Humanism : Eugenio Garin and Paul Oskar Kristeller, in Hu
 manism and Platonism in the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols., Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura,
 2003-2004,1, pp. 573-590; and C. S. Celenza, TheLost Italian Renaissance. Humanists, Historians,
 and Latin's Legacy, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins U.P., 2004, chap. 2. And see also Renaissance
 Humanism. Foundations, Forms, and Legacy, ed. A. Rabil jr., 3 vols., Philadelphia, University of
 Pennsylvania Press, 1988; Le filosofie del Rinascimento, ed. C. Vasoli, Milano, Mondadori, 2002.
 1 For one influential example see P. O. Kristeller, Marsilio Ficino and his Work after Five
 Hundred Years, Firenze, Olschki, 1987, p. 16. See also R. G. Witt, The Humanism of Paul Oskar
 Kristeller, in Kristeller Reconsidered. Essays on his Life and Scholarship, ed. J. Monfasani, New
 York, Italica, 2006, pp. 257-267; and P. F. Grendler, Paul Oskar Kristeller On Renaissance Uni
 versities, ibid., pp. 89-130.
 2 See P. O. Kristeller, A Thomist Critique of Marsilio Ficino's Theory of Will and Intellect,
 in Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume, English section π, Jérusalem, American Academy for
 Jewish Research, 1965, pp. 463-494. This article was the first modem discussion, with a partial
 édition of Bandello's critique, of this event; for the full text, see P. O. Kristeller, Le thomi
 sme et la pensée italienne de la renaissance, Paris, Vrin, 1967, pp. 187-278. For Lorenzo's account
 see L. De' Medici, L'altercaftone, in Idem, Opere, 2 vols., ed. A. Simioni, Bari, Laterza, 1914,
 11, pp. 35-65. For Ficino's account see M. Ficino, Quid est félicitas, quod habet gradus, quod est
 eterna [1473?], in Idem, Opera omnia, 2 vols., Torino, Bottega d'Erasmo, 1962, 1, pp. 662-665;
 and see the criticai édition of this letter in Idem, Lettere 1. Epistolarumfamiliarium liber 1, ed. S.
 Gentile, Firenze, Olschki, 1990, pp. 201-210. The complicated textual and contextuel relations
 as well as the broader politicai and intellectuel implications of Lorenzo's L'altercatone or De
 summo bono, and Ficino's Epistola de felicitate and his Orario ad Deum theologica are discussed,
 with further references, in J. Hankins, Humanism and Platonism in the Italian Renaissance, Ro
 ma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2003-2004, n, pp. 317-350. For a detailed discussion of the
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 Giorgio Benigno Salviati, which was written during the 1470s and presented
 the Scotist approach to this question,1 to make this point clear. The impetus
 derived both fforn internai developments in fifteenth-century scholasticism
 and from the humanist penchant for bringing recently recovered ancient
 philosophical texts into traditional discussions. This created complicated re
 lations between scholastic and humanist philosophers on issues common to
 both groups, such as human dignity and the place of man in nature.2
 Discussions of whether the intellect or the will is the better or superior
 faculty and of the precise relationship between them, as well as a detailed ac
 count of their moral psychology and of voluntary actions, cannot be found
 in ancient classical sources and are essentially the création of the medieval
 philosophical schools. The notion of will was not often explicitly discussed
 in ancient thought; and it was Augustine who first discribed the will as an
 independent faculty of the human soul.3 Nevertheless, we should not as
 sign the over-simplified labels of 'intellectualisé and 'voluntarist' to Thomas
 Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, or other scholastic thinkers.4 If we consider the
 différent formulations of this question by Thomas, in many différent con
 texts, a much more complicated picture emerges. He treats the will as an
 intellectual appetite (appetitus intellectivus) in his commentary on Aristotle's
 dispute between Ficino and Bandello see A. Edelheit, Vincenzo Bandeïlo, Marsilio Ficino, and
 the Intellect/Will Dialectic, «Rinascimento», xlvi, 2006, pp. 299-344.
 1 See P. Z. C. Sojat o.f.m., De voluntate hominis eiusque praeeminentia et dominatione in ani
 ma secundum Georgium Dragisic (0.1448-1520), studium historico-doctrinale et editio Tractatus: 'Fri
 dericus, De animae regni principe', Roma, Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1972, pp. 139
 219. For a discussion of this text see A. Edelheit, Human Will, Human Dignity, and Freedom:
 A Study of Giorgio Benigno Salviati's Early Discussion of the Will, Urbino 1474-1482, «Vivarium»,
 xlvi, 2008, pp. 82-114.
 2 A famous example is Giovanni Pico della Mirandola's i486 oration, in which we find a
 clear connection between human dignity and freedom of choice; see his De hominis dignitate,
 Heptaplus, De ente et uno e scritti vari, ed. E. Garin, Firenze, Edizione Nazionale dei Classici
 del Pensiero italiano, 1942, pp. 104-106. It is important to note that Pico does not use voluntas
 or libertas here, but only arbitrium and arbitrarius. For a general évaluation of the humanists'
 contribution to this issue, especially that of Coluccio Salutati, see C. Τrinkaus, In Our Image
 and Likeness. Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, 2 vols., Chicago, University
 of Chicago Press, 1970, 1, pp. 51-102, and his The Scope of Renaissance Humanism, Ann Arbor,
 University of Michigan Press, 1983, pp. 263-273.
 3 See, for instance, Augustine, De trinitate iv, 21, where he sets out an analogy between th
 ree mental qualities of memory, intellect and will and the three persons of the Trinity. See al
 so A. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, Berkeley, University of California Press,
 1982, chap. 6 for Augustine; and R. Sorabji, The Concept of the Will From Plato to Maximus the
 Confessor, in T. Pink, M. W. F. Stone, eds., The Will and Human Action From Antiquity to the
 Présent Day, London, Routledge, 2004, pp. 6-28.
 4 See, for instance, the fourteenth-century Franciscan Francis of Marchia, Commenta
 rius in iv libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi. Quaestiones praeambulae etprologus, ed. N. Mariani
 o.f.m, Grottaferrata, Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 2003, pp. 518-519.
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 De anima.1 In his commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences, however, he
 provides further détails: the intellect and the will belong to the superior part
 in the human soul; and while the intellect is superior to the will according to
 its origin, the will is superior to the intellect according to its perfection.2 For
 Thomas, the will is that special appetite which follows the intellect's percep
 tion. 3 On the other hand, it is more attached to action than to the intellect,
 and it is more the ruler of its own activity (and thus truly free) than the in
 tellect, since the intellect is compelled to act always according to the same
 truth. For this reason, man is regarded as good or evil according to the act
 of his will, which is identified with moral agency.4 Yet in Thomas' Stimma
 theologiae we find that the will and the intellect contain one another, with
 no sign of real contrast between them.5 They differ only in the way they
 act: the intellect acts thanks to its similarity with the thing which is under
 stood, while the will acts thanks to an inclination towards the thing which
 is willed.6 Thomas regarded both the intellect and the will as rational facul
 ties which act in accordance with nature, so that the will is unable to adhere
 to the good which is its object.7 This point was sharply criticized by Scotus,
 who distinguished between liberty and nature and between contingent and
 necessary activity: each power can act either according to nature or accord
 ing to liberty. Ali powers except the will are naturai and thus necessary and
 not ffee. Therefore, the intellect does not have the power to act more or less
 fìrmly: it always acts according to its relation with the truth or the naturai
 principle which moves it. It is within the power of the will, however, to agree
 more fìrmly with the good or not to agree with it. Thus, Scotus claims that
 Connecting the truth to the intellect and the good to the will is not impor
 tant. 8 What is more fundamental for him is to determine how exactly the
 1 Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis librum de anima commentarium 2, 5, 288. See also in 3,15,
 824.
 2 Τhomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros sententiarum 1,1,1,1.
 3 Ibid., 1, 45,1,1.
 4 Ibid., 11, 7, 2,1. Cfr. the formulation in 11, 25,1, 2, where the will is superior, because it has
 power over ali the faculties of the soul, since the end is its object; Thomas introduces here his
 notion of freedom. 5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1. q. 16, a. 5.
 6 Ibid., 1. 27, 4. 7 Ibid., I. 62, 8.
 8 J. Duns Scotus, Ordinario 1, dist. 1, p. 2, q. 1; see Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia, ed. P. C.
 Balie, Vatican City, 1950,11, p. 16. On the notion of the will in Scotus and in Scotists of the
 fourteenth century, see the studies of G. Alliney, La contingenza della fruizione beatifica nello
 sviluppo del pensiero di Duns Scoto, in Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti. Atti
 del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale, Roma 9-11 marzo 1993, ed. L. Sileno, Roma, Antonianum,
 1995, 11, pp. 633-660; Idem, Fra Scoto e Ockham: Giovanni di Reading e il dibattito sulla libertà a
 Oxford (1310-1320), «Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale», vii, 1996, pp. 243
 368; Idem, La ricezione della teoria scotiana della volontà nell'ambiente teologico parigino (1303-1316),
 «Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale», xiv, 2005, pp. 339-404; Idem, The
 Treatise on the Human Will in the Collationes oxonienses Attributed to John Duns Scotus, «Medio
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 intellect and the will act, in terms of necessity and contingency, liberty and
 nature. Epistemology is also involved here, since the act of the will is not
 described by Scotus as an abstraction of a universal ffom a singular; instead,
 many willed things are presented to the will by the intellect, and the will can
 will each one of the things presented to it.1 While the intellect, for Scotus, is
 a naturai power which is not free, i.e., it always acts in the same way with re
 gard to an object which effects it - in other words, the intellect is compelled
 by the object, and there is no element of free choice in its activity2 - the will
 is a free power which acts contingently and can, for instance, choose or not
 choose a sinful act. But it is beyond the power of the will to determine the
 very nature of an act which is presented to it; the will cannot change the
 nature of a given object or act, but can only choose between acts.3 Some in
 teresting implications in the fields of moral psychology and moral theology
 arise ffom the fact that it is impossible, according to Scotus, for the same pow
 er to act differently in the présent life (in via) and in the future life (in patria).
 Thus, the will also acts freely and contingently in patria towards the supreme
 good and béatitude, and cannot 'not will' it. But 'not willing' in patria does
 not imply any evil or offence towards the perfection of the supreme good.4
 Let us turn now to Alamanno Donati's discussion concerning the intel
 lect and the will, comparing it whenever necessary with three contempo
 rary discussions - Ficino's 'humanist' account of this issue, and two 'scho
 lastic' treatments, by the Scotist Salviati and the Thomist Bandello - as well
 as with the position of the scholastic schools in general. Donati's De intel
 lectus voluntatisque excellentia was probably written between 1482 and 1487,5
 evo»· xxx, 2005, pp. 209-269. See also M. J. F. M Hoenen, Scotus and Scotist School. The Tradition
 of Scotist Thought in the Medieval and Early Modem Period, in E. P. Bos, ed., John Duns Scotus.
 Renewal of Philosophy, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1998, pp. 197-210.
 1 Ibid., p. 33. 2 Ibid., p. 35. 3 Ibid., p. 36, n. a.
 4 J. Duns Scotus, Lecturain librum primum sententiarum I, dist. 1, p. 2, q. 2; see Ioannis Duns
 Scoti Opera omnia, cit., xvi, p. 100. On this passage, see G. Alliney, La contingenza della frui
 zione, cit., p. 639, η. 25.
 5 This short treatise was edited and published (but without an apparatus fontium) by L.
 Borghi in «Bibliofilia», xlii, 1940, pp. 108-115. Borghi presented a biographical and intellectual
 sketch of Donati in his praefatio on pp. 108-109, with references to some archivai documents
 about Donati's father published in P. O. Rristeller, Supplementum Ficinianum, 2 vols., Firen
 ze, Olschki, 1937,1, p. 126, and to some letters of Ficino in which Donati is mentioned, in M.
 Ficino, Opera omnia, cit., 1, pp. 716-717 (Ficino's reply to Donati, regarding Platonic love and
 the powers in the human soul according to Plato), 834 (his letter to Angelo Poliziano on the
 love of the muses, in which he mentions Donati and recommends him warmly), 848 (another
 mention of Donati in Ficino's letter to Lorenzo de' Medici, telling him about Donati's tran
 slation of the Historia de duobus amantibus by Enea Silvio Piccolomini), 894 (Ficino's letter to
 Amerigo Corsini, in which he refers to Donati's death), 936-937 (Ficino's famous 'catalogue
 of friends and students' in his letter to Martin Prenninger, in which he places Donati in the
 second group, among his students).
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 and it provides further evidence for the connection between humanist and
 scholastic thinkers in fifteenth-century Italy, and for their common interest
 in philosophical and theological questions which were part of the medieval
 héritage.
 We know very little about Alamanno Donati. He was born in Florence in
 1458 and was a student of Giorgio Antonio Vespucci and of Ficino. He died
 in 1488.1 He was apparently among Ficino's young students during the 1470s
 and 1480s, together with Giovanni Nesi, Giovanni di Donato Cocchi, Carlo
 Marsuppini the Younger, and others.2
 The style, structure, and sources of Donati's treatise are similar to what
 one finds in the writings of Ficino, Pico and other humanist philosophers
 of the fifteenth century, combining classical rhetoric with philosophical ar
 guments. Aristotle is mentioned and cited several times, and it is clear that
 'the philosopher' is the main explicit source;3 but Donati also refers to Py
 thagoras, Horace, Porphyry, Varrò and «divus Plato noster». The only scho
 lastic philosopher mentioned here is Thomas Aquinas, whom Donati refers
 to with the same formula that he applies to Plato: «divus noster Aquinas».
 After a short opening section (p. 109), he présents ten arguments for the
 excellence and superiority of the intellect (pp. 109-111), ten arguments for
 the excellence and superiority of the will (pp. 111-114), and some concluding
 remarks (pp. 114-115).
 1 We know this from Ficino's letter dated November 4,1488, to Amerigo Corsini, in which
 he laments the death of his young student; see M. Ficino, Opera omnia, cit., 1, p. 894. For
 further biographical information see the entry on Donati in Dizionario biografico degli italia
 ni, Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, xli, 1992, pp. 6-9. His only literary work, apart
 ffom the treatise on the intellect and the will, is an Italian translation of Piccolomini's Historia
 de duobus amantibus (1444), one of the most popular works in the fifteenth century, which is
 concerned with love, a theme which was also very centrai in Ficino's circle but dealt with ve
 ry differently by them. On Giorgio Antonio Vespucci (c.1434-1514) see K. Schlebusch, Per una
 biografia di Giorgio Antonio Vespucci, «Memorie Domenicane», xxvm, 1997, pp. 152-154, and see
 also F. G allori, S. Nencioni , I libri greci e latini dello scrittoio e della biblioteca di Giorgio Antonio
 Vespucci, «Memorie Domenicane», xxvih, 1997, pp. 155-359.
 2 On Nesi see C. Vasoli's article cited p. 109, n. 1 below, as well as C. S. Celenza, Piety
 and Pythagoras in Renaissance Florence. The Symbolum Nesianum, Leiden, Beili, 2001. On Cocchi
 see A. Della Torre, Storia dell'Accademia Platonica di Firenze, Firenze, Carnesecchi, 1902, p.
 725. On Carlo Marsuppini the Younger see M. Ficino, Opera omnia, cit., 1, p. 937; his brother
 Cristoforo is mentioned by Donati as one of the participants in a debate on the dignity of
 the intellect and the will, of which Donati's text is its written account; see A. Donati, De
 intellectus..., cit., p. 109.
 3 On Renaissance Aristotelianism see, for instance, P. Ο. Kristeller, Studies in Renaissance
 Thought and Letters m, cit., pp. 341-392; B. P. Copenhaver, C. B. Schmitt, Renaissance Philo
 sophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992; repr. Oxford 2002, pp. 60-126; L. Bianchi, Studi
 sull'aristotelismo del Rinascimento, Padova, Il Poligrafo, 2003, and his Continuity and Change in
 the Aristotelian Tradition, in J. Hankins, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philoso
 phy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 49-71.
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 It is remarkable to find in this relatively short discussion three accounts of
 human dignity. Right at the beginning Donati argues that it is self-reflexivity
 which gives pre-eminence to man:
 man's nature is such that only when he knows himself is he superior to other living
 créatures; when he neglects this, man is necessarily stripped of his own nature. Hence
 we have this maxim: 'know yourself!', and also that saying by the wisest Pythagoras,
 'venerate yourself, man, do not defile the most sacred temple of God'; for in man God
 erected His own tent.1
 Donati chooses to open his discussion with two explicit references to pagan
 antiquity, the famous maxim of Delphi γνώθι σεαυτόν ('know thyself') and
 a saying of Pythagoras, combined with an implicit allusion to some bibli
 cal verses (e.g., Ezekiel 37, 27: «et erit tabernaculum meum in eis et ero eis
 Deus et ipsi erunt mihi populus»), in order to lend support to his statement
 on the importance of self-knowledge or self-reflexivity. The wisdom of pa
 gan antiquity and of the Bible treat man's awareness of his own situation
 as essential to his dignity. This opening statement, I would contend, already
 hints at the conclusion of Donati's treatise and indicates its novelty. Self
 consciousness or self-reflexivity are centrai to the relationship between man
 and God in theology and for the relationship between human beings in eth
 ics. As we shall shortly see in the detailed discussion of Donati's arguments
 concerning the intellect and the will, he présents two other accounts of hu
 man dignity: one focused on the intellect and the other on the will.
 Immediately after this opening statement Donati présents his reason for
 writing this text: just as in Ficino's letter of 1474,2 here too we have an echo,
 in the form of a written account, of a debate held during the last days in
 the house of the Dominican ffiar and the future bishop of Cortona Gu
 glielmo Capponi (most probably at Altopascio), to whom Donati dedicated
 his treatise. The other participants in this debate were Guglielmo's brother
 Bernardo Capponi, and Cristoforo Marsuppini, the son of the famous hu
 manist Carlo Marsuppini.3
 1 A. Donati, Deintellectus..., cit., p. 109. For another use of the Delphic maxim in contem
 porary Florence among the same group of young humanist philosophers, some of whom
 were students of Ficino, see Giovanni Nesi's sermon, delivered in 1476 and published in C.
 Vasoli, Giovanni Nesi tra Donata Acciaiuoli e Girolamo Savonarola. Testi editi e inediti, «Memo
 rie Dominicane», iv, 1973, pp. 103-179, at p. 142. Cfr. one of the theses condemned in 1277, in
 D. Piche, C. Lafleur, eds., La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Nouvelle édition du texte latin,
 traduction, introduction et commentaire, Paris, Vrin, 1999, p. 114. For Pythagoreanism in the Re
 naissance, and especially in Ficino's circle including Nesi, see C. S. Celenza, Pythagoras in the
 Renaissance, «Renaissance Quarterly», lii, 1999, pp. 667-711; Piety and Pythagoras, cit.
 2 M. Ficino, Lettere 1, cit., p. 201.
 3 A. Donati, De intellectus..., cit., p. 109. On Guglielmo Capponi (1449-C.1513) see the entry
 on him in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, cit., χιχ, 1976, pp. 60-62.
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 The next two sections will explore the two sets of arguments presented
 by Donati: ten arguments in support of the superiority of the intellect, and
 ten in support of the superiority of the will. Donati does not seem to have -
 or at least to wish to demonstrate - a preference for either of the two. The
 relation between these two sets of arguments and self-consciousness will
 be discussed at the end of this study. Donati's use of the various sources is
 important in such a context, since we have here a man who straddles the
 two camps of scholasticism and humanism, and can read some of the new
 texts as well as the old ones.
 2. Arguments for the superiority of the intellect
 Already in the first set of arguments supporting the superiority of the intel
 lect we find that Donati describes human psychology in terms of powers
 or faculties (potentiae and vires), while the virtues are given a relatively mar
 ginai role. In the first argument, seeing, knowing, and understanding (the
 powers of the intellect) are regarded as superior to other powers. These
 powers are compared to a living body, which is superior to a dead body.1
 The conclusion of this argument présents what can be regarded as an ex
 trême intellectualist position:
 But the intellect is of this kind, that it has such a perspicacious power that it would
 not only know the genus of démons, but indeed somehow it would proceed towards
 God, as if it were itself God.2
 The human intellect is thus very powerful and it plays a central role in the
 relation between man and God. This is already a step towards identifying
 the essence of man with the intellect.
 In the second argument we find for the first time a comparison between
 the intellect and the will. Self-sufficiency is here the criterion for preferring
 the intellect, which does not need the will for its opérations. The will, on
 the other hand, cannot act without the intellect, and, therefore, we cannot
 love things which are unknown to us. It is perhaps important to draw a
 comparison between Donati's and Salviati's formulation of this argument.
 For Donati,
 there is no doubt that this thing which is by no means sufficient for itself is more
 insignificant and imperfect than that which is sufficient for itself. Because of this the
 1 Ibid.
 1 Ibid. A similar argument can be found in Ficino's letter, supporting the superiority of
 love and will; see M. Ficino, Lettere i, cit., p. 207. Gentile refers here to the same argument
 in the Theologia platonica ; see M. Ficino, Theologia platonica de immortalitate animorum, 6 vols.,
 eds. J. Hankins, W. Bowen, trans. M. J. B. Alien withj. Warden, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
 University Press, 2001-2006, iv, p. 320.
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 most perfect thing in nature is regarded as that which is in need of nothing. That is
 the intellect, which produces its own opération totally without the will, since it can
 understand without the will. But the will cannot [act without the intellect]; while we
 [can] love detested things, [we can] never love unknown things.1
 Whereas Salviati writes that
 it is necessary for something to exist together with something else, and to be in need
 of something else; if there is no mutuai coexistence, [that thing] is more insignificant
 and imperfect: since that which is in need of nothing, is regarded as most perfect. But
 the act of the will is in need of, and coexists with, the act of the intellect, but the intel
 lect does not coexist with the act of the will (for we can understand without the will,
 but we cannot will unless we understand: since we are moved through the will only
 by things which we knew before); thus, the intellect is more noble.2
 What we have here are two formulations of the same argument, compar
 ing the activity of the intellect and the will on the hasis of self-sufficiency.
 One notices, however, that Thomas for instance was very cautious when
 he discussed the intellect's sufficiency, emphasizing the insufficiency of the
 human intellect, its weakness in comparison to the angels and its constant
 need for divine light (but indeed not in the context of comparing the intel
 lect and the will).3 Donati's humanistic-inclined formulation, and Salviati's
 scholastic-inclined one, seem to reflect a later development in the scholastic
 schools, where the intellect and the will were directly contrasted against
 one another under the increasing tension between the Thomists and the
 Scotists, and the argument of self-sufficiency was used.
 In the next argument Donati présents the intellect as the power which is
 peculiar and proper to man, and because of this, it is only through the intel
 lect that man can reach béatitude. The intellect is here contrasted with the
 appetite, which is identifìed with the will, and thus regarded as not proper
 to the intellectual nature and depended on the intellect.4 This argument
 dépends on one presupposition: the béatitude of an intellectual nature is
 the supreme good and end (beatitudo naturae intellectualis potissimum bonum
 et finis existit). As in the case of Ficino's letter mentioned in n. 2, on p. 104, in
 Donati's case, where the scholastic distinction between the présent life (in
 via) and the afterlife (in patria) and the parallel distinction between worldly
 1 Ibid. 2 G.Β. Salviati, Frìdericus, cit., p. 151. See also on p. 191.
 3 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum, cit., π, 7, 2, 2; 11, 28,1, 5.
 4 A. Donati, De intellectus..., cit., pp. 109-110. Cfr. Salviati's concern regarding the confu
 sion between the appetite and the will: G. B. Salviati, Fridericus, cit., p. 175. Sojat, the editor
 of this text, gives, in his footnotes on pp. 175-176, the relevant references and citations fforn
 11 Cor 5, 4, as well as ffom Thomas' Summa thealogiae (la, q. 41, a. 2; q. 60, a. 2; q. 82, a. 1) and
 De mala (q. 6), against Scotus' discussion in the Ordinatio (iv, d. 49, q. 10, n. 2-3). Cfr. Vincen
 zo Bandello's reaction to Ficino's letter in his Opusculum, cit., p. 249. These criticai remarks
 shouldbe referred to M. Ficino, Lettere 1, cit., p. 208.
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 happiness (félicitas) and divine happiness (béatitude) are not presented, we
 would have, in terms of contemporary scholastic thinking, an admixture of
 nature and super-nature, human and divine: an unacceptable situation for
 a scholastic thinker.1
 But a closer look at Donati's treatise reveals an important différence be
 tween his text and Ficino's: it seems that Donati, to some extent, is more
 willing to embrace, not always in a fully consistent way, certain philosoph
 ical terms, expressions, and modes of thought which can be classified as
 'scholastic'. While in the third argument just referred to in n. 4, p. 111, we
 had expressions like « sibi peculiare et proprium est, prò suae naturae cap
 tu», or «simpliciter et maxime proprius est», we shall have in the next argu
 ments some more examples for this tendency.
 The next two arguments are focused on the superiority of the intellect's
 opération, i.e. spéculation (speculatio), and its object, i.e. worldly happiness
 (félicitas).2 In the fourth argument Donati claims that the most perfect op
 ération is self-sufficient, and it does not require external matter, as fabricat
 ing does.3
 In the beginning of the sixth argument we have an echo of Ficino's letter
 to Donati concerning the différent powers of the single soul.4 We also have
 here the first explicit reference to Scripture.5
 In the seventh argument Donati discusses the intellect's virtue, i.e. wis
 dom, which he defines as «the knowledge of human and divine matters»,
 and which is the key for tasting «the sweetness of supreme happiness even
 during this présent life».6 We may note that here Donati does relate the
 présent life («hac vita») to worldly happiness («félicitas»), but the emphasis
 «even (ve!) during this présent life» is again an indication of his awareness of
 confusing worldly happiness and divine happiness (beatitudo), or at least of
 his awareness that there is a tension here with regard to the basic Christian
 dogma of supernatural grace. After another reference to Scripture, Donati
 1 On the termsfoelicitas and beatitudo, the first was usually more related to the classical Ari
 stotelian notion of ευδαιμονία (worldly happiness in regard to human life and ethics), while
 the second présents the Christian notion of eternai afterlife happiness, see A. J. Celano, Act
 of the Intellect or Act of the Will: The Criticai Reception of Aristotle's Ideal of Human Perfection in
 the if ' and Early 14"1 Centuries, «Archives d'Histoire et Littéraire du Moyen Âge», lvii, 1990,
 pp. 93-119. 2 A. Donati, De intellectus..., cit., p. 110.
 3 Ibid. Cfr. one of the condemned 1277 theses in La condamnation parisienne de 1277, cit., p.
 110.
 4 Ibid. See M. Ficino, Opera omnia, cit., 1, p. 717. It is perhaps important to point out that
 Ficino in this letter présents what he regards as Plato's opinion regarding the powers of the
 soul, in which ratio is considered as unique to man, while the other two powers, ira and libido
 are not: «Nempe in bestiis cum sit ira, nulla est ratio [...] Cum vero tam ira, quam libido a
 ratione différent, libido tamen magis ira videtur a rationis dignitate discedere». Cfr. the réfé
 rencés to Thomas in nn. 2 and 3, p. 106. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid.
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 clearly présents wisdom as essential for the relation between man and God,
 and even as that which grants man, a mortai animai, immortality.1 Obvious
 ly, such a notion of wisdom is strongly connected to rebgion and theology.
 Donati's discussion of sapientia in the last argument is to some extent
 close to Ficino's notion of docta religio presented in his De Christiana religione
 (1474) and contrasted to what Ficino regarded as the contemporary decline
 of Christianity.2 But we should notice that Ficino is discussing wisdom as
 such and not as the intellect's virtue, and that in his discussion there is an es
 sential distinction between human wisdom and divine wisdom, upon which
 Christianity is founded.3 Donati's argument here is thus closer to one of the
 condemned theses of 1277.4 It should remind us of the need for a detailed
 study of the status of these theses two hundred years after Tempier's con
 demnation. From what we have seen so far we can say that this condemna
 tion does not hold much authority for Donati. This is also how another con
 temporary humanist philosopher, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, regarded
 this condemnation in his Apologia (1487):
 Secondly, as is certain, and those Parisians [Doctors] themselves admitt, these articles
 do not oblige ali believers nor are we obligated to believe in them, except to the ex
 tent that they rely on the Holy Scripture or on the décisions of the universal Church.
 Whence the English are accustomed to say that these articles do not cross the sea;
 therefore we can also say - if it is allowed to joke about such a serious issue - that
 these articles do not cross the Alps. Wherefore though my conclusion is against the
 article, let those who condemned me remember that they were entirely mistaken in
 my condemnation, because they said that my conclusion was against the Apostle's
 Creed, when they should have said that my conclusion was against the Parisian creed,
 although also this is a lie as we have presented before.5
 Apparendy, this joke regarding the Parisian articles was already common
 place in contemporary discussions.6
 But let us return to Donati. Next, following Aristotle's discussion of the
 common internai sense, he présents a logicai argument according to which,
 if an object of a power is included in another object of another power, this
 power is superior to that power,7 and thus:
 1 Ibid. 2 M. Ficino, Opera omnia, cit., ι, ρ. 1. 3 Ibid., p. 8.
 4 La condamnation parisienne de 1277, cit., p. 126.
 5 G. Pico della Mirandola, Opera omnia, Basel 1557; repr. Hildesheim, G. Olms, 1969,
 p. 130.
 6 See, for instance, in G. Β. Salviati, De natura angelica (1499) in, 7; ix, 5. These examples
 are cited in C. Dionisotti, Umanisti dimenticati?, in Italia medioevale e umanistica, iv, 1961,
 eds. G. Billanovich, A. Campana, C. Dionisotti, P. Sambin, Padova, Antenore, 1961, pp. 287
 321; see p. 296.
 7 A. Donati, De intellectus..., cit., p. 110. But notice that in none of the places in Aristot
 le referred to by Donati (De anima 425a27-bn and 428b22-3o; De sensu 442b4-io; De memoria
 45oa9-i2) the sensus commuais is taken to be praestantior.
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 Indeed, who will deny that the object of the intellect, that is being qua being, includes
 the object of the will, that is the good? Since, although neither being nor the good
 could be properly defined, yet if it should be defined, the good would be defined ac
 cording to being and not being according to the good, because nothing is missing
 frorn the account of being itself, which contains everything.1
 Although he is not entirely happy with the use of définitions in this context,
 Donati is stili willing to présent it as another argument concerning the su
 periority of the intellect. With regard to the expression «ens est quatenus
 ens», it reflects typical scholastic logie and formulae coming from the meth
 odological discussion concerning the object of the intellect and the subject
 of metaphysics. In these discussions we find the distinction between redu
 plicative and specificative, the first representing a weaker and a more general
 way, the latter a more spécifie and defined way.2 Thus, the word quatenus
 here should be understood as reduplicative, and so, the object of the intel
 lect according to Donati is being in general, i.e., ali being (and not being
 qua being taken in a specificative sense, which is the object of metaphysics).
 This becomes very clear from the last sentence of the argument just quoted
 above, where Donati explains that being includes everything.
 In the last two arguments concerning the superiority of the intellect Do
 nati claims, first (in the ninth argument) that the intellect is more pure,
 genuine and abstract than the will, and thus it is more noble and perfect.
 The same goes for its opération: the opération of the intellect is regarded
 as a movement of a thing towards the intellect, while the will is regarded
 totally inferior. Donati is citing here Aristotle's saying, according to which
 truth and falshood are in the soul (έν διάνο ία) while good and evil are in
 the things (έν τοϊς πράγμασιν).3 Secondly (in the tenth argument) Donati
 compares the intellect's opération, i.e. obtaining the supreme good which
 is béatitude, with the opérations of the will, i.e. desiring, loving and delight
 ing, each of which have some relation with the end, but none of which
 obtain the end, which is béatitude.4 It is interesting to note that in both
 1 Ibid., pp. 110-111. Cfr. the reference to Scotus in n. 8, pp. 106-107 and context. For the
 identification of the object of the intellect with being see e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa
 theologiae, ìa, q. 5, a. 2. But this view was criticized by, for instance, Francis of Marchia,
 Commentarius, cit., pp. 331-332.
 2 See, for instance, J. Buridan, In metaphysices Aristotelis lib. mi, q. v, Fo. xvi. For a con
 temporary fifteenth-century discussion see G. Zerbus, Questiones metaphysice, Circa lib. 1,
 q. 2, Utrum ens simpliciter sumptum commune quiditati et modo sit scientie metaphysice
 subiectum primum primitate adequationis, an ens solum commune deo et creature, Propter
 quatrum, Bononie: Perjohannem de Nordlingen et Henricum de Harlem socios, 1482, f. (not
 numbered) aiovb. I would like to thank Dr. Marco Forlivesi for his helpful remarks on this issue.
 3 A. Donati, De intellectus..., cit., p. 111.
 4 Ibid. Compare these last two arguments of Donati with Vincenzo Bandello's critique of
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 arguments Donati uses the same formula («ut ita dixerim») just after using
 some scholastic phrases («est enim intellectio quidam» and «summi boni
 adeptio formaliter»), as though he were apologizing for using such terms.
 The conclusion of argument ten présents once again an extreme intellectu
 alist position according to which the whole of béatitude is obtained by the
 opération of the intellect, that is understanding.1 This is followed by the
 conclusive remarks to the first ten arguments, in which Donati is relying
 on Aristotle's Ethics for identifying human dignity with the intellect, which
 is also regarded as an essential instrument for man's association with the
 angels, and his ability to contemplate God and divine matters.2 This is of
 course a Christian and an intellectualist reading of Aristotle.
 Just before moving on to présent the ten arguments in favour of the will
 Donati remarks that the first set of arguments in support of the intellect
 are according to his own judgment most valid arguments.31 see no reason
 why we should not take this remark seriously. Thus, we are not dealing here
 with a more rhetorical exercise, but rather with a philosophical and a theo
 logical discussion which was taken seriously by the author and his ffiends
 who participated in the oral debate.4 If this is indeed the case, a further
 study is required with regard to the theological context of the intellectualist
 position among scholastic and humanist thinkers in the last décades of the
 fifteenth century.
 3. Arguments for the superiority of the will
 It is striking to find right at the beginning of the first argument in support
 of the will the words «liberior» and «libertas».5 The essential relation be
 tween freedom and the will was of course a commonplace among scholas
 tic thinkers, certainly after John Duns Scotus and among the Scotists during
 the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.6 But in Ficino's letter in support of
 Ficino's letter; V Bandello, Opusculum, cit., pp. 211-212. Ficino's argument is in Lettere 1, cit.,
 p. 206.
 1 Ibid. Cfr. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum, cit., iv, 49,2,1; Quaestiones disputatile de anima, q. 5.
 2 Ibid. Cfr. Τhomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 2a-2ae, q. 180, a. 6. But Thomas is very cau
 tious in his response to this argument, sharply distinguishing between the human intellect
 and that of the angles. Donati's remark regarding the dignity of man and his status in nature
 cannot be found in Thomas in this context.
 3 Ibid.
 4 Doubts regarding the seriousness of such debates were raised in E. Rummel, The Huma
 nist-Scholastic Debate in the Renaissance and Reformation, Cambridge MA, Harvard University
 Press, 1995, pp. 1-18.
 5 A. Donati, De intellectus..., cit., p. 111. Cfr. P. Lombardi, Sententiae in iv libris distinctae
 11,25, 8, 6. As we shall see in n. 4, p. 116, this opinion is contrasted to Scotus' sharp distinction
 between nature and will.
 6 On the notion of the will in Scotus and among the Scotists in the fourteenth century
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 the will to which we have already referred several times this term is not even
 mentioned. Donati in this opening sentence not only mentions the term
 freedom, but he also defìnes it as a faculty of acting or not acting in this or
 that manner («libertas enim quae facultas est agendi sic aut non agendi»),
 This définition, I would contend, already bears a Scotist influence which is
 not found in Ficino's letter and which represents Donati's greater familiarity
 with contemporary scholastic discussions.1
 Freedom is thus inséparable from the will in the Scotistic discussions.
 Donati contrasts it to seeing, knowing and understanding, i.e., the pow
 ers of the intellect described in the first argument supporting the intellect.
 Freedom is now the faculty through which a power can be regarded more
 perfect and be identified with the good. Horace and Aristotle are quoted
 in support of this argument.2 But we do not have in Aristotle a clear-cut
 preference for voluntary instead of necessary.3 Such a clear-cut distinction
 is basically the product of scholastic philosophy, mainly emphasized by Sco
 tus and developed by his followers in the context of human agency. Thus,
 when Donati claims that Aristotle prefers a voluntary factor to a naturai
 factor («Aristoteles... agens voluntarium agenti naturali praeponit») he is
 in fact following the Scotists in contrasting the will with nature.4 It is in
 teresting to find a reference to the same place in Aristotle's Physics in both
 Donati and Scotus (see notes 2 and 4). Donati may have read this passage
 of Scotus or of some Scotists referring to it. But it is important to stress the
 fact that Aristotle's context here is physics and not ethics, and that we only
 have in Aristotle a distinction (without contrasting and preferring) between
 things which are in accordance with intention and those which are not (τά
 μέν κατά προαίρεσιν, τά δ' ού κατά προαίρεσιν), and these things are
 regarded as falling outside what is necessary (παρά το άναγκαϊον), but stili
 some of them are done for the sake of something (το ενεκά του). Among
 things which are done for the sake of something, another distinction is in
 troduced, between thought and nature (εστί. δ' ενεκά του όσα τε άπό
 διανοίας αν πραχίΐείη και όσα άπό φύσεως).5 Ali this is very far front the
 see the detailed studies of Alliney and Hoenen mentioned in n. 8, pp. 106-107. Fot a fiffeenth
 century Scotist discussion of the will and freedom see G. B. Salviati, Fridericus, cit.
 1 On this see G. Alliney, La contingenza della fruizione beatifica, cit., p. 639, especially the ré
 férencés to, and discussion of, Scotus' lectura prima on pp. 634-645. And see also the référencés
 to Scotus in nn. 8, p. 106; 1-4, p. 107. 2 A. Donati, De intellectns..., cit., pp. 111-112.
 3 The problem of the will in Aristotle and in ancient philosophy in general has been the
 subject of many discussions in recent years. See the référencés to the detailed discussions of
 Dihle and Sorabji in n. 3, p. 105.
 4 J. Duns Scotus, Lectura, 1, dist. 1, p. 2, q. 2; in Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia, cit., xvi, p.
 90. This is cited also in G. Alliney, La contingenza della fruizione beatifica, cit., p. 635, η. il.
 5 Aristotle, Physica 1961117-22. We do not have any sign of the will in the Latin translation
 of this passage either; see Physica, Translatio Vêtus, eds. F. Bossier andj. Brams, Leiden, Brill,
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 Scotistic theory of the will and its implications in moral psychology, ethics,
 theology, and metaphysics, to which we have an echo in Donati's first argu
 ment in support of the will.
 Donati continues by using typical Scotistic rhetoric:
 Indeed, who will deny, unless he is mad, that freedom should be ascribed only to the
 will which moves everything, while the rest of the faculties exercise their own opéra
 tions according to the will's command?1
 Donati describes an epistemological process which is completely dépendent
 upon the will: first the intellect gently understands at least something, then
 the will directs it towards matters which should be perfectly understood,
 and détermines those matters which should not be considered. Many times,
 Donati claims, the will restricts the intellect which tends to regard false mat
 ters as if they were true; the will invents reasons through which it would
 be possible to examine these matters. Thus, this epistemological process
 reveals the great servitude of the intellect and the endless freedom of the
 will.2 It is exactly at this point that we find the first mention of Thomas
 Aquinas. It is urgent for Donati to explain that Thomas, who is of course
 the main authority among the Dominican 'intellectualists', did not mean
 that reason or the intellect form freedom in reality («revera»), but only em
 phasized that ratio précédés libertas on the logicai and epistemological lev
 el,3 as shown in the epistemological process outlined above.
 In the second argument we find a clear echo of Ficino's letter. The cri
 terion presented here for a superior power is that the opération of which
 can never be wrongly used or misused. This is of course love (amor), the
 opération of the will, which is regarded as essential for the proper relation
 between man and God, partly due to the weakness of the human intellect
 and to human arrogance. Thus, cognitio and scientia are contrasted to caritas
 and bonitas,4
 The third argument is a response to arguments eight and nine in sup
 port of the intellect, where being and truth were regarded as superior to
 1990, vii ι, p. 68. We have an interesting distinction in the Latin, between the intellect and
 nature, which is totally contrasted to the Scotistic distinction between nature (including the
 intellect) and will.
 1 A. Donati, De intellectus..., cit., p. 112. Cfr. G. Β. Salviati, Fridericus, cit., p. 178. We can
 find in Thomas the relation between self-movement, liberty, and free choice, but without in
 volving the will, and with a clear Aristotelian emphasis on cognition, intellectual judgement,
 and causes; see, e.g., in his Summa contragentiles 11, 48. Liberty, will, and self-movement are ali
 présent in Thomas' Scriptum, cit., m, 17,1,1. This is stili not enough for the Scotist position.
 2 Ibid. Cff. the reference to Scotus in n. 1, p. 107, and with Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum, cit.,
 in, 23, 2, 2.
 3 Ibid. Cfr. the reference to Thomas in n. 2, p. 106. I could not find such formulation in
 Thomas. 4 Ibid. Cff. M. Ficino, Lettere 1, cit., p. 205.
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 the good. The object of a power is here the criterion for its superiority, and
 so the good which is the will's object is regarded as more noble than the
 intellect's object, i.e. the truth.1 No further reason is presented here since,
 apparently, Donati dedicated a hook to the nature, quality, and perfection
 of the good according to the Platonists.2 We know nothing of such a hook
 by Donati.
 In the fourth argument, the term «imperium» is mentioned: according
 to a common opinion the power of commanding should be given to that
 which is more noble.3 We have here also for the first and only time in this
 treatise the phrase «voluntatis arbitrium», which is regarded as the driving
 force of the intellect, without which the intellect invest itself in investigat
 ing matters and speculating about them.4 It is important to notice that the
 term «liberum arbitrium», ffee choice or ffee will, one of the most centrai
 terms in the debates concerning the intellect and the will, is not mentioned
 or discussed at ali by Donati.
 An activity which is désirable for its own sake is presented in argument
 five as the criterion for the more noble power.5 Thus, Donati contrasts
 «gaudium», the opération of the will, with «visio», the opération of the
 intellect.6
 In the sixth argument another common opinion of learned men (the ori
 gins of which can be traced back to Aristotle, De caelo 29532-4, 301320-22,
 302b5-8) is presented: it is better to be moved by naturai movement and by
 one's own movement, which is also regarded as internai, than by violent
 and foreign or outside movement.7 Then, Donati présents an analogy be
 tween the soul which is more noble than the body also because it grants the
 body its movement (the origins of which can be traced back to Aristotle, De
 motu animalium 7oob6-n), and the will, which is regarded as the self-moving
 driving force of the intellect, directing itself towards intellectual and sensual
 powers.8 Here we face a crucial différence between Donati and the Scotists:
 while the Scotists, as has already been noted contrasted the will with nature
 or with naturai powers, Donati has no problem in comparing the will with
 1 Ibid. Cfr. the reference to Scotus in n. 8, p. 106. 2 Ibid.
 3 Ibid. This common opinion is a commonplace in classical literature but terms presenting
 politicai power were also popular in the discussions of the intellect and the will. See, for instan
 ce, the title of Salvinati's dialogue Fridericus, de animae regni principe, and the argument on p.
 180. See also V. Bandello, Opusculum, cit., p. 278. Cfr. the reference to Thomas in n. 4, p. 106.
 4 Ibid., pp. 112-113.
 5 Ibid. p. 113. Cfr. the second argument in support of the intellect cited and discussed in n.
 1, p. 111, and context.
 6 Ibid. Cfr. M. Ficino, Lettere 1, cit., p. 206; Bandello, Opusculum, cit., p. 259.
 7 Ibid. This Aristotelian principle can be found in De caelo 301820-22.
 8 Ibid. For the last image of the heart Cfr. G. B. Salviati, Fridericus, cit., p. 182. And see
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae ia-2ae, q. 56, a. 3.
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 «naturalis et proprius motus». The only explicit authority mentioned here
 for the idea of the will as the source of ali movement is Thomas.1
 Thus, we have here only a partial reception of the Scotistic position re
 garding the will. Donati accepts the importance of ffeedom in defending
 the superiority of the will, but he does not mention liberum arbitrium, nor
 does he contrast the will with nature. On the other hand, he follows the
 Scotists' device of using also the Angelic Doctor as an authority in their
 discussions of the will.2 We should keep in mind that Donati's aim is not to
 prove the superiority of either the intellect or the will, but rather, to prove
 the importance of both as the most important faculties in the human soul,
 as explicitly implied in the title of his treatise.
 By the end of the sixth argument Donati présents what he regards as a
 false syllogism: it does not follow that if the intellect holds the end, which
 moves the will, then the intellect is either the will's end or that it moves the
 will. He points out that although the intellect should first know the end, by
 which the will is moved, it is not because of the act of understanding itself
 but rather because of the end that the understanding is moved. Therefore
 the conclusion here is that the will is superior to the intellect because of
 movement.3 This part of the argument corresponds to argument eight in
 support of the intellect: in both cases Donati is willing to use 'scholastic'
 methods like définitions and syllogisms in order to prove his point.
 In the beginning of argument seven we have a typical humanistic remark,
 in which Donati admits to preferring Plato to Aristotle.4 But in fact, as we
 have already seen and as is also évident in this argument (where we find the
 only reference to Plato), Donati's treatise is full of explicit and implicit réf
 érencés to Aristotle. The main line of this argument taken from Aristotle
 is that priority in time does not imply priority in substance but quite the
 opposite: in nature we find progression from a modest beginning of imper
 fect and incomplete things towards perfect and complete things.5 Varrò and
 Plato are mentioned as the authorities for a methodological remark accord
 ing to which harmonious présentation of examples is the most outstanding
 form of instruction. This remark is indeed followed by two examples from
 nature: leaves are prior in time to flowers and flowers to fruits, but with re
 gard to their importance it is the opposite order: fruits, flowers, leaves. The
 same goes for the human offspring, in which we notice a progression from
 1 Ibid. See Τhomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae ia-2ae, q. 9, a. 1; q. 10, a. 2; q. 79, a.2; q. 81, a. 1.
 2 Cfr. G. B. Salviati, Fndencus, cit., pp. 168 and 175.
 3 A. Donati, De intellectus..., cit., p. 113. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 2a-2ae,
 q. 2, a. 2.
 4 Ibid. On the Plato-Aristotle controversy see J. Monfasani, Marsilio Ficino and the Plato
 Aristotle Controversy, in M. J. B. Allen, V. Rees, M. Davies, eds., Marsilio Ficino: His Theolo
 gy, His Philosophy, His Legacy, Leiden, Brill, 2002, pp. 179-202. 5 Ibid.
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 the vegetative towards the sensual and finally towards the intellectual life.
 Ail this shows, Donati claims, that although the will is posterior to the intel
 lect in nature, it is prior in its importance.1
 In the eighth argument Donati returns to the theme of the 'dignity of
 man', this time claiming in a rather personal tone that he believes that the
 most noble power in the human soul is that to which God, Whose wisdom
 is endless and Who cannot err, gave the responsibility to take care of ali
 the other powers. This power is of course the will, «our queen who moves,
 chooses, and commands ali matters».2 The personal tone expressed by the
 word credo right at the beginning of the argument may reflect Donati's own
 preference for this argument. We may also note the emphasis on the divine
 origin of the will's superiority. The will is related to the very essence of
 man:
 And it is indeed not wrong [to say] that only through this will man would he rewarded
 and would sin. Since by taking away the will, you find in us nothing worthy of either
 praise or disgrâce. Through this [will] we are praised, blamed, raised; because only
 thanks to this [will] or at least mainly thanks to it man exists.3
 Matters theological and ethical, as well as the existence of man, are ali
 mainly dépendent upon the will. On this point Donati is again very close to
 the Scotists.
 In the penultimate argument Donati returns to the Aristotelian idea of
 sensus communis which we have seen in argument eight in support of the
 intellect. The criterion presented here for a superiority of something is
 self-existence, i.e., things which hold the principle of their own existence
 in themselves and are not dépendent upon some external principle. Such
 things are regarded as more perfect, since their end is regarded as more no
 ble.4 The example given is that of the fìve external senses, which are inferi
 or to the internai common sense since they are dépendent upon this inter
 nai sense for their perfection.5 This is compared with the intellect, which
 is in fact or in reality («re vera») inferior to the will, and, though it précédés
 the will, it is stili dépendent upon the will which is the queen of our soul.6
 In the last argument in support of the will, Donati présents the relation
 between the will and caritas: front the will, which is the supreme power,
 arises the supreme virtue, which is caritas.7 The rest of this argument con
 tains a praise of both the will and caritas.8
 1 Ibid. Notice that the words adductio and vegetalis which appear here are not classical. Cfr.
 the référencé to Thomas in n. 2, p. 106.
 2 Ibid., pp. 113-114. Cfr. n. 4, p. 92 and n. 3, p. 118.
 3 Ibid., p. 114. Cfr. the référencé to Thomas in n. 4, p. 106. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.
 6 Ibid. We have seen this image in nn. 4, p. 106; 3, p. 118; 1, p. 120.
 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.
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 4· Donati's concluding remarks
 Donati opens his concluding remarks by emphasizing that he has discussed
 the excellence of humankind, which is the excellence of the mind or the
 intellect and of the will.1 These faculties of the soul are contrasted with «in
 animatae suppellectilis possessio», because of which proper and true goods
 are neglected, and many people most unfortunately hold temporary things,
 which are not really their own, as more important than their innate facul
 ties.2 The final accord of the treatise is focused on the supernatural divine
 light upon which human dignity dépends, and here it is contrasted even
 with the worldly powers which stood at the centre of the whole discussion,
 i.e. the intellect and the will, as part of an élégant rhetorical self-reference
 and criticai account of the author regarding his own work.3
 But what is the relation between Donati's three différent accounts of hu
 man dignity? In other words, what is the relation between self-reflexivity or
 self-consciousness, the intellect, and the will? Self-reflexivity becomes both
 the condition through which man can make use of his best powers - the
 intellect and the will - and the instrument through which man becomes
 closer to God; thus, it is essential to both theology and ethics. In Donati's
 text there is a tension between two conflicting tendencies: on the one hand,
 to show the excellence of both the intellect and the will, and on the other, to
 show which of these powers in the human soul should be regarded as better
 or stronger. But Donati's contribution to the discussion of this issue is in pre
 senting self-reflexivity as the key for proper use of the powers in the human
 soul, including both intellect and will. It is évident that Donati shows here
 greater awareness of the rich scholastic tradition than his teacher Ficino re
 garding the philosophical and psychological complexities of the intellect/
 will debate which had originated in the scholastic schools. In this regard,
 perhaps, he was more a student of Giorgio Antonio Vespucci, an important
 figure in Fiorentine intellectual history who joined the Dominicans at San
 Marco under the influence of Savonarola during the 1490s. Because of his
 untimely death, Donati cannot be regarded as a major influential figure; but
 nonetheless, his importance lies in the fact that he somehow bridged the
 gap between a humanist thinker like Ficino, and some contemporary scho
 lastic thinkers like Vincenzo Bandello and Giorgio Benigno Salviati.
 Ibid. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., pp. 114-115.
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